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In this perspective article, we first outline the large diversity of methods, measures,
statistical analyses, and concepts in the field of the experimental study of unconscious
processing. We then suggest that this diversity implies that comparisons between
different studies on unconscious processing are fairly limited, especially when stimulus
awareness has been assessed in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that flexible
choices of methods and measures will inevitably lead to an overestimation of
unconscious processes. In the concluding paragraph, we briefly present solutions and
strategies for future research. We make a plea for the introduction of “best practices,”
similar to previous attempts to constitute practicing standards for functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).
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INTRODUCTION
To what extent are our actions and thoughts determined by “unconscious” influences, that is, by
influences that we ourselves are not aware of? Sixty years after the infamous marketing campaign
launched by James Vicary in 1957, who claimed that unconsciously flashed messages can affect
observers’ consumption behavior (Karremans et al., 2006), this question has lost nothing of its
fascination. What is more, the development of scientific methods, like neuroscientific instruments
or psychophysical “blinding” techniques, has made it possible to assess unconscious processes
from different perspectives and within a wide range of contexts. There is, however, a downside
to this multifaceted approach to unconscious processing: It comes along with substantial diversity
between scientific studies.
In the following sections, we will first provide a brief overview of aspects in consciousness
research that are affected by this diversity. Afterward, we will outline the risks associated with such
divergent approaches. We will conclude with a section on practical recommendations for future
research.
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DIVERSITIES REGARDING DIFFERENT
EXPERIMENTAL ASPECTS
Diversity in Suppression Techniques
Today, a wide range of psychophysical paradigms exist
to experimentally manipulate sensory awareness, particularly
within the visual domain (Bachmann et al., 2007). Such
psychophysical “blinding” methods can evoke a transient
blindness in neurologically intact observers, i.e., they can be used
to render a physically presented target stimulus (or, features of
it) invisible, in most cases for a limited amount of time. It is
important to keep in mind that the available paradigms vary
with respect to what types of stimuli can be suppressed from
awareness, and how effective the suppression is, for instance in
terms of duration and predictability of suppression onset and
offset (Kim and Blake, 2005). But there is yet another level
of diversity related to the “blinding” methods that has only
recently begun to be studied systematically. In 2014, a Frontiers
Research Topic [“Invisible, but how?”; edited by (Dubois and
Faivre, 2014)] addressed the issue of the inherent differences in
the amount of information let through by different suppression
techniques. Put simply, it is not enough to know that a stimulus
has been invisible, but it is crucial to also know how exactly
invisibility was achieved, because it has become apparent that
different levels of suppression depth are associated with different
suppression methods. Recently, this notion has been formalized
into a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing
(Breitmeyer, 2014). Eventually, such a functional hierarchy will
allow to formulate predictions about the level of unconscious
processing that can be expected in a specific experimental setup
(Breitmeyer, 2015).
In the absence of such prior assumptions on the depth of
visual suppression associated with a specific paradigm, every
new study reporting high-level unconscious processing is equally
weighted, independently of the applied suppression method.
When accumulating evidence across single studies, this might
lead to the wrong conclusion that unconscious perception is
unlimited. However, it is known that different suppression
methods are associated with different levels of suppression.
Therefore, for example, the evidence presented for unconscious
processing under CFS should be stronger, as a plausible prior
assumption could be that CFS leads to a relatively high level of
suppression. Ideally, the functional hierarchy would be based on
cumulative research strategies, and incorporate not only studies
that directly compared results from different methods with each
other (Izatt et al., 2014; Peremen and Lamy, 2014a), but also take
data from neuroimaging studies into account (Fogelson et al.,
2014; Ludwig et al., 2016).
Diversity in Awareness Measures
The question of how to optimally measure awareness in
experiments on unconscious processing has been a long-standing
one, and the issue is still much debated (e.g., Merikle and
Reingold, 1990; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Schmidt and Vorberg,
2006; Sandberg et al., 2010). While criteria for valid awareness
measures have been formulated (Shanks and John, 1994; De
Houwer et al., 2009; Newell and Shanks, 2014), there is no
accepted “gold standard.” We will briefly outline the diversity
of frequently applied measures of awareness, but this overview
is not meant to be exhaustive. One crucial differentiation
is the distinction between objective and subjective measures
of awareness. According to the objective awareness criterion,
forced-choice detection or discrimination performance above
chance level indicates stimulus awareness, while performance
at chance level indicates its absence. Subjective measures of
awareness, on the other hand, are based on participants’
metacognitive judgements on their own mental states (Lau and
Rosenthal, 2011). Usually participants perform such judgments
either on their own experience of the stimulus, or on their
accuracy in a discrimination task. In the first case, participants
are required to rate the visibility of the stimulus, either on a
larger (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004) or smaller scale (Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004). In the second case, participants have
to evaluate how confident they felt with their response in a
previously performed discrimination task (e.g., Rothkirch et al.,
2012). The pros and cons of objective and subjective awareness
measures have been summarized elsewhere (e.g., Hesselmann,
2013). A further distinction can be made between filtering
measures and aggregate measures of awareness. If behavioral
reports are provided on a trial-by-trial basis during the main
experiment (“online”), filtering allows the experimenter to post-
select subsets of trials for further analysis (e.g., “seen” vs. “not
seen”). By contrast, aggregate measures allow inferences only
about blocks of trials and thus depend on more than a single
trial (e.g., percent correct, d’). Behavioral reports may be recorded
either after a block of trials or in a separate control experiment
(“oﬄine,” or “two-task design”). If a pre-defined criterion, such as
performance at chance level, is satisfied, the experimenter infers
that stimulus awareness was absent during the main experiment
(or, in a given block of trials). Importantly, diversity does not
end here, and the devil is in the details. For example, it has
been shown that the exact composition of a block of trials (e.g.,
blocks with weakly and fully visible stimuli, vs. blocks with only
weakly visible stimuli) can influence the experienced level of
awareness [(Lin and Murray, 2014); also see (Pratte and Rouder,
2009)]. Levels of stimulus awareness may also change in longer
experiments, e.g., awareness can increase across trials due to
perceptual learning (Schwiedrzik et al., 2011; Ludwig et al., 2013).
Finally, the presence or absence of trial-by-trial awareness reports
can in turn influence the effect of interest, e.g., response priming
(Peremen and Lamy, 2014b).
Diversity in Statistical Analysis
We will briefly illustrate the diversity in the statistical analysis
of awareness test data by an example. It is not uncommon
that participants perform a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC)
discrimination task in a control experiment, either in addition
to a subjective awareness measure (e.g., Hesselmann et al.,
2016), or without any further awareness tests during the main
experiment (e.g., Koechlin et al., 1999; Mattler and Palmer, 2012).
To show that participants did not perceive the presented stimuli,
researchers then often apply null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) on the 2AFC data, either at the subject level or at the
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group level. Alternatively, the researcher may choose to apply a
cutoff, e.g., consider 2AFC performance below 60% as indicative
of an absence of stimulus awareness. It is well understood that
when the NHST procedure is underpowered (or, the power
is unknown), the experimenter risks to falsely accept the null
hypothesis, i.e., conclude that there is no deviation from chance
level when there actually is a deviation (Vadillo et al., 2016b).
For example, the number of trials included in the awareness test
may determine whether participants are categorized as aware
or unaware, simply because tests comprising more trials also
yield more sensitive measures. There have been suggestions to
avoid the problem of type II errors by using equivalence tests
and equivalence confidence intervals (Overgaard et al., 2013).
A challenge related to such equivalence tests, however, is the a
priori definition of a boundary around chance level that is still
considered acceptable to indicate unawareness (Lin and Murray,
2015). Recently, Bayesian statistics have more frequently been
applied to establish chance performance (e.g., Dienes, 2015; Sand
and Nilsson, 2016). The details of this approach are beyond
the scope of this perspective article, but it is important to keep
in mind that Bayesian statistics are inherently diverse too. For
example, when using Bayes factors to estimate the evidence in
favor of the null model, there are different options for specifying
the predictions of the alternative model (i.e., the case where
participants saw the stimulus). One particularly relevant feature
of the Bayesian approach seems to be sequential sampling, i.e.,
the strategy to collect more data until the evidence in favor of one
model is considered as conclusive. Beyond the question of NHST
or Bayesian statistics, post hoc selection of data has frequently
been used, for example when residual stimulus visibility greatly
varies between participants in experiments using interocular
suppression (e.g., Sklar et al., 2012). The idea is to perform the
main statistical analysis on a post hoc selection of the recorded
data, e.g., by excluding participants whose subjective or objective
behavioral reports indicated stimulus awareness, or by exclusively
analyzing “not seen” trials. It has, however, been criticized to
interpret “not seen” trials purely in isolation (Schmidt, 2015).
Instead, these trials should be contrasted against seen trials, i.e.,
trials in which the suppression of the critical stimulus was not
successful (cf. Madipakkam et al., 2015). Furthermore, especially
in cases in which a large number of trials or participants are
excluded, data analysis can resemble some form of extreme
group analysis. Due to regression to the mean such an analysis
strategy can yield a statistical bias in the selected sample and let
the researcher erroneously assume unawareness in the selected
participants (Shanks, 2016). The magnitude of regression to the
mean in a data set is indicated by the correlation between the
awareness measure and the measured effect. In this context,
a model taking only into account regression to the mean can
function as a null model against which the experimental effect
can be tested. It has to be noted, however, that the extent to which
the experimental effect differs from such a null model neither
conclusively demonstrates nor precludes an unconscious effect.
Diversity in Experimental Setting
In a typical psychological experiment, stimuli are presented to
participants who are asked to elicit a particular response to
these stimuli. If such an experiment is intended to investigate
unconscious processes, the unconscious dimension could be
related to different aspects of the experimental setup. Firstly,
participants could be unconscious of the presented stimulus,
which is usually achieved by some form of masking (Kim and
Blake, 2005). The second category is constituted by studies
in which the putatively unconscious process pertains to the
relationship between the stimulus and participants’ behavior.
This is, for instance, typically the case in studies on social priming
(Bargh, 2016). Finally, the behavioral response or sequence of
responses elicited by the participants might be unconscious,
as in studies focusing on learning processes (Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001).
While in cognitive psychology the focus lies primarily on the
unawareness of the stimuli, in social psychology the relation
between stimuli and observers’ behavior is often the primary
target (Doyen et al., 2014). Especially in the latter case, however,
it proves difficult to determine whether the process of interest
is indeed unconscious. As pointed out by (Stafford, 2014), for
instance, the degree to which observers lack knowledge about
associations between stimuli and their behavior that is required to
be considered ‘unconscious’ is conceptually elusive. An ostensible
remedy often chosen in the face of this predicament is then to
mask the stimulus such that it cannot be consciously perceived
anymore. This demonstrates that the different approaches to
study unconscious processes are often used as if they were
interchangeable, although they might target distinct processes.
Remarkably, it is widely accepted, on the one hand, that
consciousness is not a unitary process, but that there are instead
distinct modes of ‘consciousness,’ which, for instance, implies
that observers might have conscious knowledge about one aspect
of a particular stimulus while lacking conscious access to other
aspects of that same stimulus (Zeki and Bartels, 1998; Navajas
et al., 2014). In contrast, however, unconsciousness is sometimes
treated as a singular process that does not require a further
differentiation, although the term “unconscious” is not unitary
either (Moors and De Houwer, 2006).
CONSEQUENCES OF THE OUTLINED
DIVERSITIES
As summarized above, researchers have several options to
study and identify unconscious processes, ranging from the
experimental design to the statistical analysis of the acquired
data. While this patchwork of approaches could be deemed
beneficial in the sense that it entails a more extensive overview
of the phenomenon of unconscious processing, we argue that it
more likely has the opposite effect. It should be noted that the
diversities detailed above have distinct implications. On the one
hand, they can have direct consequences on the interpretability
of findings from single studies, which can, in severe cases, imply
that participants were actually not unaware of the presumed
unconscious process. Such consequences are especially related
to the diversities discussed in section “Diversity in Awareness
Measures and Diversity in Statistical Analysis.” On the other
hand, the diversities regarding the experimental setting
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(see section Diversity in Experimental Setting) and the
suppression techniques (see section Diversity in Suppression
Techniques) have less impact on single studies, but play a more
important role at the conceptual level, that is, when the findings
across several studies are intended to be integrated into a general
framework or model of (un)consciousness.
Specifically, studies differ with respect to the way awareness or
unawareness, respectively, is assessed and statistically analyzed.
This means that different criteria are set to determine whether
participants are aware or unaware of a particular stimulus or
process. For a given study, it is thus not sufficient to simply
know whether participants were unaware, but instead according
to which criterion participants were unaware, since it cannot
be precluded that other criteria might indicate participants’
awareness of the critical stimulus or process. This, however,
limits the comparability between different studies, especially
when awareness has been assessed in different ways. For example,
two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have
investigated neural activity in visual areas when images of
objects were rendered invisible with CFS (Fang and He, 2005;
Hesselmann and Malach, 2011). In one study (Fang and He,
2005), participants were asked to report whether they perceived
any shape or object in the preceding block of trials. In the
other case (Hesselmann and Malach, 2011), participants provided
trial-by-trial visibility ratings on a 3-point scale. It could be
argued that only a limited comparison of the effect of interest is
possible between the two studies, since evidence for participants’
unawareness was based on different types of responses.
Another critical aspect that especially pertains to the
assessment of observers’ awareness is the flexibility in data
analysis based on the vast amount of awareness definitions.
Simply put, if researchers are interested in demonstrating that
observers were unaware they could choose to report a particular
analysis that indeed speaks in favor of observers’ unawareness,
while neglecting that other criteria might have indicated
awareness. For example, when faced with the divergence
of subjective and objectives measures in some participants,
researchers may argue in terms of “blindsight” in normal
observers (Hesselmann et al., 2011), criticize the underlying
assumption of different objective and subjective thresholds
(Peters and Lau, 2015), or choose one or the other measure to
demonstrate observers’ unawareness. Such a flexible choice could
overstretch the concept of unawareness and consequently lead to
an overestimation of unconscious processes, as the researcher has
the “freedom” to report only the particular analysis that confirms
their expectation (cf. Simmons et al., 2011).
On a more conceptual level, the vagueness of the terms
“awareness” and “consciousness” allows one to operate with
them in different contexts (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). If
two different studies make reference to “unconscious processes,”
the reader may likely assume that similar processes have been
studied, although one study may, say, use visually masked stimuli
while the other one may focus on “unconscious processes” in
response to visible stimuli. Such an inflationary reference to
“awareness” and “consciousness” bears the risk of counteracting
a differentiation between qualitatively distinct phenomena and
may eventually – perhaps even inevitably – lead to the claim that
unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-
level cognitive function that conscious processes can perform
[(Hassin, 2013); for a reply (Hesselmann and Moors, 2015)],
and thus impede deeper insights into the nature of unconscious
processes.
Finally, one can speculate that the outlined diversities also
contribute to the current crisis of confidence in psychological
research. Some of the findings on unconscious processes,
including, among others, effects of social priming and
unconscious perception, turned out to be difficult to replicate
(Doyen et al., 2012; Hesselmann and Knops, 2014; Moors et al.,
2016), show clear signs of bias (Shanks et al., 2015; Vadillo et al.,
2016a), or are open to alternative explanations (Stein et al., 2016;
Street and Vadillo, 2016).
SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
One obvious strategy to handle the described diversity is
the formulation of explicit guidelines for the assessment and
statistical analysis of awareness. Such guidelines may not only
help to unify the fragmented approaches that exist to study
unconscious processing, but also may serve as a guide for
researchers who are not yet acquainted with the peculiarities and
pitfalls related to the assessment of observers’ level of awareness.
They should, however, not be understood as a discrete set of
binding rules. Instead, we propose that the whole field should
strive for the establishment of ‘best practices,’ similar to previous
attempts to constitute practicing standards for fMRI (Poldrack
et al., 2017) and EEG research (Picton et al., 2000). For example,
the “21-word-solution” (Simmons et al., 2012) that is intended
to make the post hoc exclusion of conditions and/or participants
transparent, could easily be adopted by the field, given the fact
that post hoc exclusions may indeed cause serious problems
in studies on unconscious processing (Shanks, 2016). Ideally,
full transparency of methods should be the norm. Notably, the
current diversity between studies will not be completely abolished
by such an intervention, but only reduced. The definition of
an overarching ‘gold standard’ would not be feasible, since, for
instance, the possibilities to assess awareness are often limited by
the particular experimental design.
Moreover, it should be acknowledged that qualitatively
distinct phenomena are subsumed under the umbrella
terms “consciousness” and “unconsciousness.” To increase
the understanding of the scope and limits of unconscious
processes, however, such a deficient differentiation seems
counterproductive. Thus, to reflect and accentuate that research
on unconscious processing stems from a variety of experimental
settings, a more fine-grained taxonomy of unconscious
phenomena seems expedient. For instance, studies in which
the processing of visually masked stimuli is investigated could
consistently label “unconscious processing” as “subliminal
processing” (Dehaene et al., 2006). In contrast, if supraliminal
information is processed unbeknownst to the observer in an
incidental manner, as in the case of “unconscious learning
processes,” one could label this as “implicit processing.”
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The choice of such terms should also be tailored to their
underlying assumptions, as in the case of “subliminal” for
instance, which could suggest a high-threshold model. Thus,
other labels may be more suitable. Especially to keep up
with the development of new techniques, methods, and
experimental designs, however, such a differentiation is generally
advisable.
Finally, we believe that a great service to this field will be
done by an adherence to openly available data, so that the results
can be reproduced, and the conclusions tested against alternative
statistical analyses.
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